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Kevin Barry, the Incident at Monk’s Bakery and the Making 
of an Irish Republican Legend 
 
By JOHN AINSWORTH 
 
In Mountjoy Jail one Monday morning, high upon the gallows tree, 
Kevin Barry gave his young life for the cause of liberty. 
But a lad of eighteen summers, still there’s no one can deny, 
As he walked to death that morning, he proudly held his head on high. 
[Opening verse of the ballad, “Kevin Barry”] 
 
Ireland in 1920 was in the midst of an undeclared war between the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), representing the independence aspirations of militant Irish nationalism, and 
the forces of the British Crown. In the absence of a declaration of war or martial law in 
Ireland, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) led the way in combating the IRA, with the 
military acting in support of the civil power. The IRA employed the “hit and run” tactics 
of the guerilla fighter, wearing civilian clothes and using the element of surprise to attack 
Crown forces and then melt away and blend in once more with the population at large.1 
As a consequence of this guerilla campaign, in the eighteen months to June 30, 1920, a 
total of 55 policemen had been killed by the IRA and a further 74 wounded, while the 
military suffered only a handful of casualties, including five fatalities.2 
 
The British authorities in Dublin and London responded to this situation by militarising 
the RIC, forming units of British ex-servicemen (Black & Tans) and officers (Auxiliar-
ies) in 1920 to complement the ranks of the police force and utilise their recent exper-
ience from the Great War (1914-1918) to take on the IRA gunmen and their supporters. 
This served to intensify and extend the level of violence in Ireland rather than reduce it, 
however, and instigated a phase in the conflict known in Irish circles as the “Tan War”.3 
The British Government also sought to utilise the military more effectively via the 
Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (ROIA), implemented in August 1920 and providing 
for military courts-martial and courts-of-enquiry to replace magistrates’ courts and 
coroners’ inquests in areas where the IRA was considered to be active. This allowed the 
British authorities in Ireland to by-pass the jury system of these civil courts which, given 
the prevailing influence of the militant nationalists, had not been functioning in the 
interests of the Crown for some time. The ROIA also extended the jurisdiction of courts-
martial to include capital offences, with the first conviction in this regard resulting from 
the arrest by British troops of a young IRA member, Kevin Barry, on 20 September 
1920.4 
 
When he first came to prominence in September 1920, Kevin Barry was an 18 year old 
medical student nearing the end of his first year of tertiary studies at University College 
Dublin (UCD). He was also an active member of the IRA, having joined amongst a surge 
of new recruits following the death in British custody in September 1917 of Thomas 
Ashe, a prominent figure in Irish nationalist circles.5 After participating in a number of 
smaller actions against Crown forces with H Company of the 1st Battalion, Dublin 
Brigade, Kevin Barry played a leading role in a large-scale raid for arms carried out by 
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the Brigade on June 1, 1920, against a British military post situated at King’s Inns in 
Henrietta Street. Once the raiding party had surprised and disarmed the soldiers on guard 
at the entrance to King’s Inns, Barry led a section through the rear of the building to the 
guardroom, where he and his colleagues helped themselves to about two dozen rifles, two 
Lewis guns and as much ammunition and other military material as they could carry. 
 
The success of this raid was a boost to the arsenal and morale of the Dublin Brigade.6 For 
the British Army, however, it indicated a ‘slackness’ on the part of the military guard at 
King’s Inns, which the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, General Sir Nevil Macready, 
readily admitted in confidential correspondence with the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff (CIGS) in London, Sir Henry Wilson. Moreover, this and other incidents like it, 
General Macready observed, were symptomatic of a more fundamental problem for 
British soldiers serving in Ireland, arising from ‘the fact that S[inn] F[ein] are at war with 
us while we are at peace with them....’7 It was a matter that would have to be addressed, 
and quickly. But, in the meantime, Macready issued instructions to all military personnel 
in Ireland to be on the alert and not to surrender their arms without a fight.8 So the next 
time Barry’s IRA group and the British Army met, the opposition from the latter was 
bound to be more determined than it had been previously. 
 
Over the summer holiday period in 1920, which he spent as usual at Tombeagh, near 
Hacketstown in County Carlow, helping his elder brother, Michael, work the family farm, 
Kevin Barry was also active with C Company of the 3rd Battalion of the IRA’s Carlow 
Brigade. According to the recollections of the company commander, Matt Cullen, Barry 
participated in raids to obtain arms from loyalists’ homes, cut telephone lines to the local 
police barracks and intercept the mail in the hope of learning how much the police knew 
about the Carlow Brigade and its activities. And when the RIC evacuated the barracks at 
Hacketstown, he was among those who burned the vacant building to the ground in order 
to deny its use in future to the forces of the Crown.9 
 
The greater part of Barry’s contribution to the struggle for Ireland’s independence, how-
ever, was made via his association with the Dublin Brigade of the IRA. His superiors in 
the Dublin Brigade believed that he was known to the British authorities as an IRA 
activist, though there is nothing in the extant records to support such a belief. Thus, when 
in Dublin, Barry had been staying with his uncle, Patrick Dowling, at 58 South Circular 
Road, rather than with his mother and sisters at 8 Fleet Street, in response to a warning 
from the IRA ‘not to sleep at home.’10 As he was not warned to stay away from classes at 
the UCD medical school, it does not seem to have occurred to the Dublin Brigade 
command that, if the authorities had really known about Barry’s activities and wanted to 
pick him up, they could have done so simply by waiting for him there. 
 
In what would be his last action with the Dublin Brigade, Kevin Barry participated in a 
surprise attack on a small party of British soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, Duke of 
Wellington’s Regiment, collecting bread rations from Patrick Monk’s Bakery at 79-80 
Upper Church Street, near the corner of North King Street, Dublin, around 1130 hours on 
Monday, 20 September 1920. This British ration party comprised four unarmed men – a 
lorry driver, sergeant-in-charge (Archer Banks) and two bandsmen-privates – with an 
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armed escort of six soldiers. Apparently, while the sergeant and two bandsmen were 
walking down the passage-way from Church Street towards the bakery courtyard, several 
members of the IRA group suddenly emerged from the crowd armed with pistols, 
converged on the British lorry parked in the street and shouted “Hands up. Hand over 
your arms.” When the soldiers of the escort did not comply, some of the IRA group 
opened fire at them while others who had taken positions inside the bakery premises then 
began to shoot at Sergeant Banks and his two companions. But immediately upon the 
British escort returning the IRA group’s fire, the latter withdrew without taking any arms, 
as intended, and leaving one of their number, Kevin Barry, to be captured hiding under 
the British lorry with a loaded pistol in his hand. British casualties in this attack were one 
soldier from the escort (Private Henry Washington) killed instantly and two of his 
colleagues (Privates Matthew Whitehead and Thomas Humphries) fatally wounded, with 
two privates from the ration party (Bandsmen William Smith and Frank Noble) being 
‘slightly wounded.’11 Barry as a prisoner was one of four known IRA casualties. Among 
the others, Bob O’Flanaghan was the most seriously injured, suffering a deep bullet 
wound to the scalp that required medical treat-ment, including stitching, and a period of 
two months for recuperation. By comparison, the injuries to Sean O’Neill and Harry 
Murphy were only slight.12 
 
After being taken into custody by Sergeant Banks, Barry was conveyed under guard to 
barracks nearby at the North Dublin Union and held there in the detention room. Under 
interrogation a short time later by two commissioned and three non-commissioned 
officers of the 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers, he gave his name – which the British 
seem to have mistaken as ‘Berry’ - and ‘stated that the raiding party consisted of about 20 
men and that there was a Ford Motor Car with no number on it also there.’13 He refused 
to give any further details to his interrogators, however, despite threats and their eventual 
resort to brute force - twisting his right arm vigorously for several minutes and inflicting 
severe pain on the prisoner - in a quest for information regarding the names and 
whereabouts of his IRA companions. Though he did not complain at the time about being 
mistreated in this manner, a Royal Army Medical Corps officer who examined him the 
following morning did report that the symptoms of wrist sprain displayed by Barry were 
consistent with the prisoner’s claim that his arm had been twisted by British military 
personnel during the interrogation at the North Dublin Union.14 As a consequence, the 
medical officer placed Barry’s arm in a sling, which he would continue to wear for about 
three weeks thereafter while recovering from this injury. Yet he was fortunate in a way 
not to have been the victim of much harsher mistreatment on the part of his military 
captors, given his undeniable association with the death of one young British soldier at 
the hands of the IRA that morning and the horrific abdominal wounds inflicted on two 
others. The wounded Private Humphries, in particular, was obviously and audibly in 
agony when the lorry transporting Kevin Barry under guard, along with the three victims 
of this IRA attack, arrived at the North Dublin Union. But the soldiers maintained 
military discipline in the face of such provocation even though, as General Macready 
later admitted, the prisoner was ‘roughly handled’ in the lorry ‘until rescued by an officer 
and locked up.’15 Had he been a prisoner of the dreaded Auxiliaries or Black and Tans, 
his fate would surely have been much more unpleasant than the experience he received 
after being ‘locked up’ in the North Dublin Union detention room. 
 4 
 
In any case, both the British military and political authorities in Ireland had more at stake 
in Kevin Barry than any information he could provide about his IRA associates. Now, for 
the first time, they were in a position to bring before a military court, rather than the 
patently unreliable civil alternative, an IRA member who had been captured while armed 
and in the act of attacking Crown forces. That in itself was not sufficient to condemn him. 
But, as the attack had resulted in the deaths of three young British soldiers, the prisoner in 
this instance would face a capital charge of murder or, at the very least, of having been an 
accessory to murder. Ultimately, on 20 October, after the British had completed their 
investigation, Kevin Barry was tried by court-martial at Marlborough Barracks on one 
count of murder relating to Private Matthew Whitehead, found guilty and sentenced to 
death by hanging. Rather than disputing the details of the charge and offering some form 
of defence during these proceedings, Barry dismissed his defence counsel, Sean Woods, 
and refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the court. Once the court’s decision on the 
death penalty was confirmed and made public on 28 October, appeals for clemency began 
to be heard from a variety of sources. But they were rejected by the British authorities in 
London and Dublin on the grounds that Barry’s guilt had been clearly established, his age 
was barely less than any of the three young British soldiers who lost their lives as a result 
of the Monk’s Bakery incident and, also, for the sake of example, given ‘that it was 
precisely young and irresponsible men of this type who were the main cause of the 
present disturbance in Ireland.’16 As a consequence of the dismissal of these appeals, 
Kevin Barry was executed at Mountjoy Prison in Dublin at 8:00am on All Saints’ Day, 
Monday, November 1, 1920. 
 
With the death of the ‘Bakery Gun Boy’, as one Dublin Castle official called him, the 
legend of Kevin Barry as a young, heroic, Irish republican victim of British injustice was 
born.17 How did this situation come about? The context of developments in this regard is 
significant in seeking an answer to this question. Barry’s capture occurred on the same 
day the Black and Tans sacked Balbriggan, a small town about 20 miles north of Dublin, 
in retaliation for the assassination by the IRA of a local head constable of the RIC, named 
Burke, and the wounding of his brother. This outrage by the RIC militia left two 
supposed Sinn Fein suspects dead, four public and nineteen private houses destroyed, 
along with an English-owned hosiery factory, and caused damage to a further thirty 
homes. It attracted critical comment in the English press, including The Times which saw 
a sinister motive in such action on the part of the British Government, and from a former 
Prime Minister and then Liberal leader in the House of Commons, Herbert Asquith, who 
compared this situation to that perpetrated by the Germans in Belgium in 1914.18 Another 
RIC reprisal took place the following day, after the death of five Black and Tans shot 
with flat-nosed bullets in an IRA ambush at Rineen in west Clare. Incensed by the sight 
of the horrific wounds inflicted on their comrades, regular RIC officers and Black and 
Tans ran amuck, killing a man in a hay-cart and burning eight houses at nearby Milltown 
Malbay, then moving on to Ennistymon where they shot and killed another man and a 
twelve-year-old boy, as well as burning four houses and a drapery shop, and then finished 
up by setting fire to the town hall and seven houses at Lahinch, with a man suspected of 
involvement in the IRA ambush party being burned alive inside one of these houses. A 
similar outbreak occurred at Trim early in the morning of 27 September, when about 200 
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members of the RIC militias responded to an IRA attack on their barracks by looting and 
burning shops, private homes and public houses in the town. These were examples of a 
pattern or surge of apparently spontaneous reprisals against the civilian population by a 
militarised RIC which, coincidentally or otherwise, had begun to intensify once the new 
ROIA came into effect in August 1920, and would continue unabated until officially 
authorized reprisals by Crown forces were instituted from January 1921.19 Such 
outrageous behaviour on the part of the RIC captured the attention of the press in Ireland, 
England and overseas - especially in the United States - with the British Government 
being accused by its critics of conniving in a systematic program of barbaric reprisals 
against the Irish people.20 The only slight consolation for the British authorities was the 
observation by Stephen Gwynn, Irish correspondent for the Observer, that the conduct of 
British troops in the aftermath of the Monk’s Bakery incident demonstrated ‘that reprisals 
are no part of the policy of the military command.’21 
 
Yet the military command in Ireland was concerned that the bad example being set by the 
RIC militias could lead to similar outbreaks by British soldiers provoked into reprisals by 
the IRA. There had already been a few isolated instances of this kind involving military 
personnel, following an upsurge in IRA attacks against them. General Macready was 
appalled at such developments and anxious to demonstrate to his subordinates that legal 
means, via the conviction and execution of the sentences of courts-martial under the 
ROIA, could bring the perpetrators on the IRA side to justice. So for the sake of example 
and in the interests of preserving military discipline in the British Army in Ireland, he 
was determined to see the provisions of the ROIA applied to the fullest extent which, in 
the case of Kevin Barry, meant proceeding with his execution no matter what.22 Such 
resolve was also shared, for the most part, by the civil authorities at Dublin Castle who 
considered that, if ever the circumstances of a case justified inflicting a penalty of death,  
this had to be it.23 
 
The Globe newspaper in London carried a report on Friday, 22 October, that Barry had 
been sentenced to death, but this decision by the military court-martial was not confirmed 
and made public through the mainstream press in Ireland and Britain until 28 October – 
only four days prior to the date set for his execution. In the meantime, the adverse 
publicity generated by the surge of reprisals perpetrated by the RIC militias had diverted 
public attention from Barry’s plight. And a further distraction also had emerged, follow-
ing the death in Brixton Prison on 25 October of Terence MacSwiney, Lord Mayor of 
Cork and former commander of the IRA’s No.1 Cork Brigade, after a seventy-four day 
hunger strike in protest at his arrest and conviction by court-martial in August for 
possession of seditious material. Unlike the situation earlier, in April 1920, when suspect-
ed republican activists in custody in Mountjoy Prison had won their release by resorting 
to a hunger-strike, this time the British authorities ‘remained firm and refused to give 
way from the position they had taken up.’24 Nor did they attempt forced feeding, as had 
happened with fatal consequences in the case of Thomas Ashe in 1917. Instead they 
chose to let matters run their course, resulting ultimately in the death of MacSwiney 
along with two less heralded colleagues – Michael Fitzgerald and Joseph Murphy – who 
were part of a group of ten prisoners in Cork Jail to follow his example with respect to a 
hunger-strike. MacSwiney’s funeral was held in Cork on Sunday, 31 October, which was 
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widely observed as a national day of mourning in response to a declaration in this regard 
by the Dail Eireann. 
 
The press announcements on Thursday, 28 October, confirming the death sentence on 
Barry, saw the start of an intense campaign for a reprieve as the date for his execution 
loomed. Irish newspapers, such as the Independent and Freeman’s Journal, condemned 
the sentence and called for a reprieve in this case, with the latter emphasising Barry’s 
youth as a key factor through repeated reference to him as ‘Master Barry’.25 Joseph 
Devlin, representing the Irish Nationalist Party at Westminster as the member for the 
Falls Division of Belfast, appealed directly but unsuccessfully to the Prime Minister on 
the same basis. The Westminster Gazette echoed Devlin’s appeal in an editorial on 29 
October, expressing the hope that ‘the prerogative of mercy will be used in the case of the 
lad Barry, who….is only 18….’26 Others involved in the reprieve movement included 
Dublin’s Catholic Archbishop, William Walsh, and Lord Mayor, Laurence O’Neill. They 
made representations in turn on 30 October to General Macready, Sir John Anderson, an 
Under Secretary at Dublin Castle, and then to Field Marshal Sir John French, the Lord 
Lieutenant, basing their joint appeal not on Barry’s youth as others had done, but ‘solely 
on the bad effect his execution would have upon the population….’27 When this approach 
failed, they telephoned the Prime Minister himself at home late on 31 October, only to 
receive a firm and final rejection of their appeal for Barry’s life to be spared. 
 
Neither Kevin Barry himself nor his family ever supported the campaign for a reprieve. 
Indeed, his mother reacted angrily on 31 October to a suggestion from James MacMahon, 
joint Under-Secretary with Sir John Anderson at Dublin Castle that, with his assistance, 
she should send a telegram to Buckingham Palace appealing to the King personally for 
clemency in respect of her son.28 The Barrys held firmly to the view that events should be 
allowed to take their course and, if Kevin was to be executed, then his right to die for the 
republic for which he had been fighting with the IRA should not be compromised in any 
way.  
 
The propaganda campaign from which this legend would derive was mounted by Sinn 
Fein coincidentally, but not in association with the campaign for a reprieve, as the latter 
involved people who were generally not affiliated with militant nationalist elements. It 
began with an open letter to the British press from Erskine Childers, the well-known 
English author, soldier and civil servant, who had been raised in County Wicklow and 
become a prominent advocate for and activist in the Irish independence movement. 
Published in the Westminster Gazette shortly before Barry’s execution, Childers’ letter 
declared in part: 
 
This lad, Barry was doing precisely what Englishmen would be doing under the 
same circumstances and with the same bitter and intolerable provocation – the 
suppression by military force of their country’s liberty. To hang him for murder 
is an insulting outrage, and it is more: it is an abuse of power; an unworthy act of 
vengeance, contrasting ill with the forbearance and humanity invariably shown 
by the Irish Volunteers towards the prisoners captured by them when they have 
been successful in encounters similar to this one.29 
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‘A Message to the Civilised Nations of the World’ issued through the Irish Bulletin on 29 
October by acting President of the Dail, Arthur Griffith, made much the same point on 
the question of the treatment of prisoners. By selective reference to three recent examples 
where British military prisoners had been taken in engagements with the IRA and then 
released – including the King’s Inns arms raid in June - Griffith claimed that ‘Hundreds 
of members of the [British] armed forces have been from time to time captured by the 
Volunteers and in no case was any prisoner maltreated, even though [in one such case] 
Volunteers had been killed and wounded in the fighting….’30 Griffith was deliberate here 
in using examples relating to IRA engagements with British military forces rather than 
the police, for he knew that the latter in particular were usually of an uncivilized nature, 
characterized by violence and brutality albeit on both sides by this stage. Nor did he 
mention that Barry had been captured by the British not as a uniformed soldier, but in the 
civilian disguise of a guerilla fighter with flat-nosed ammunition in his pistol. Griffith 
abhorred violence and brutality in any cause, which posed a dilemma for him given that 
the IRA was the military arm of the Sinn Fein government over which he then presided  
during the absence of Dail President, Eamon De Valera, in the United States. During this 
period, as his biographer Brian Maye has observed, Griffith seems to have developed 
something of ‘a split personality, privately condemning certain Irish acts of violence 
while publicly denouncing British aggression, and at the same time trying to put some of 
his original passive-resistance policies into practice.’31 His split personality in this 
instance enabled him to function as an effective propagandist, focusing on the positive 
elements of the situation for public consumption while ignoring the negatives altogether. 
 
Barry himself, though initially ‘reluctant to make such a fuss,’ supported the propaganda 
campaign after receiving orders on 28 October from his brigade commander, Richard 
McKee, ‘to make a sworn affidavit concerning his torture in the North Dublin Union....’ 
In this regard, arrangements had been made for Barry’s sister, Kathy, to deliver the 
affidavit to Desmond Fitzgerald, Director of Propaganda for Sinn Fein, ‘with the object 
of having it published in the World press, and particularly in the English papers, on 
Saturday 30th October.’32 The English press was targeted especially in this campaign 
because, as the Dail’s own Propaganda Department observed, ‘the outside world...was 
chiefly dependent upon the representatives of foreign [news]papers living in London who 
were themselves dependent upon English sources for their news of Ireland.’33 Details 
from the affidavit were eventually published in the English as well as the Irish press, but 
not until shortly after Barry’s execution, when its content also became the subject of 
heated debate in the House of Commons to which it was read in full on 4 November by 
John Henry Thomas, Labour member for Derby and General Secretary of the National 
Union of Railwaymen. Barry’s death on All Saints’ Day saw masses dedicated to him 
throughout the land, and outrage expressed by the local press at the merciless attitude of 
the British authorities. Then came the first of many ballads, which gave Irish nationalists 
everywhere a ready and enjoyable means of remembrance and celebration of the sacrifice 
of one who was now to become an integral and lasting part of Irish republican folklore. 
Composed anonymously in November 1920 by an expatriate Irish worker in Glasgow and 
simply called “Kevin Barry”, it brought together the various elements of the propaganda 
campaign, to sustain the legend that was born the moment the hangman brought his life to 
an end.34 Thus, the focus was on Barry as a patriotic young Irish volunteer taken prisoner 
by British soldiers while defending his ‘country’s liberty’, who displayed fortitude under 
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torture by his captors, as well as courage and composure in the face of certain death on 
the gallows at Mountjoy Prison. Though factual in every respect, this image gave only 
part of the overall story – a situation which the British should have been able to utilise for 
their own propaganda, or at least counter-propaganda purposes. 
 
A British propaganda unit, the Public Information Bureau (PIB), had been established in 
Dublin Castle in August 1920, with branches also located at General Macready’s head-
quarters in Dublin and at the Irish Office in London. Under the direction of Basil Clarke, 
formerly a journalist with the Manchester Guardian, war correspondent for the Daily 
Mail and Special Intelligence Branch Director at the Ministry of Reconstruction, the 
PIB’s function was ‘to give publicity to the facts of the Irish political situation and its 
incidents which at that time were seriously misrepresented to the public as a result of 
Sinn Fein and anti-British propaganda.’35 So the means were at hand for the British to 
make a response of their own to this Sinn Fein propaganda campaign. And the bases for a 
credible response were there too. 
 
The Dublin Brigade’s purpose in the Monk’s Bakery operation had been to take the 
British ration party’s armed escort by surprise, seize their weapons and then depart the 
scene without delay or further incident. It was not expected that this would take very 
long. The IRA group assembled for this task outnumbered its opponents by about 2 to 1, 
probably outgunned them by a similar margin and did have the element of surprise. Barry 
was a late addition to the raiding party – he had been on holiday at Tombeagh and only 
came up to Dublin originally to attend an exam at UCD that Monday afternoon. When he 
heard about ‘the Monk’s Bakery job’, however, he had insisted on being included 
considering, as he later told his sister, Kathy, that it ‘should have been well over before 
his exam at 2 pm.’36 As he had left his own pistol at Tombeagh, Barry’s company 
commander, Seamus Kavanagh, gave him a recently reconditioned .38 Mauser automatic 
pistol for this particular operation. Both this pistol and his IRA companions were to let 
him down badly on that fateful day. 
 
According to Barry’s own account of events, the pistol jammed on the first shot which he 
then had to remove. After quickly clearing the jam, he fired twice at the British escort in 
the lorry before the pistol jammed again. Being unable to clear it as easily this time, ‘he 
knelt down beside the lorry for shelter, while he struggled with the jammed gun.’ As 
Barry focussed his attention on this seemingly impossible task, suddenly ‘he noticed a 
silence’, realised that his IRA companions had departed the scene without giving the pre-
arranged whistle blast to signal their retreat, and left him alone in the midst of the enemy. 
So he dived under the lorry in the hope that he might have ‘a chance of getting clear 
when it drove away.’ He may have done too, if a woman standing nearby had not shouted 
hysterically as the British soldiers were about to drive off: “There’s a man under the 
lorry.”37 Barry was immediately apprehended and taken in the British lorry, together with 
the fatally wounded young soldiers, to the North Dublin Union.   
 
From the IRA’s perspective, this whole operation had been a debacle – though three 
British soldiers had been fatally shot, the members of the larger IRA group, even with 
greater firepower and the element of surprise, had fled the scene immediately the surviv-
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ing members of the British escort had returned their fire, failed to capture a single rifle 
and left one of their number, Kevin Barry, a captive in the hands of the enemy in circum-
stances where a capital conviction was a certain outcome. Why ever was Barry, as a late 
inclusion in the raiding party with an unfamiliar weapon to use, allocated a key role as 
one of the three-man section – together with Sean O’Neill and Bob O’Flanagan - to 
confront the British escort at the back of the lorry parked in Upper Church Street? And 
how could he and O’Flanagan later claim that a signal for retreat by the IRA party had 
been agreed beforehand while O’Neill, the deputy company commander, denied any such 
knowledge?38 These questions point unequivocally to serious deficiencies in the Dublin 
Brigade’s planning and execution of the Monk’s Bakery operation as causes pertinent to 
the calamitous outcome for both sides. They also indicate confusion on the Irish side as a 
key element in this IRA debacle. 
 
Comments penciled anonymously on the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers’ incident report of 20 
September 1920 demonstrate how differently the same scenario could be interpreted for 
propaganda purposes from a pro-British perspective. They proffer a description of the 
engagement at Monk’s Bakery as ‘a cowardly attack [by the IRA] with no guts to push it 
home’, while the British escort is said to have shown firm resolve and ‘refused to 
surrender’. The author of these comments was obviously anticipating the propaganda 
implications of the situation and offering some food for thought in this regard. He went 
on in an attempt to further his denigration of Barry’s accomplices, by concluding with the 
observation that they had ‘shielded themselves by the crowd that saved their skins.’39 
This was the kind of exposition of the Monk’s Bakery incident that one might expect to 
have seen utilized by Basil Clarke and his propaganda team in the PIB, though they were 
surprisingly mute on the subject. 
 
The evidence against Barry was conclusive and damning. He did not deny the testimony 
of witnesses at the scene, that he had shot directly at the soldiers of the British escort in 
the lorry, and was proven via ballistic tests to have fired the bullet that fatally wounded 
Private Whitehead. Significantly too, examination of the pistol taken from him showed 
two of the three remaining bullets to be ‘flat nosed bullets.’40 The use of such bullets was 
in breach of the Hague Convention and ‘barred by all civilized nations’, as General Mac-
ready noted.41 Of course, Barry could have denied personal responsibility in this matter 
on the basis that he had been given the pistol by one of his IRA superiors and did not 
know about the flat-nosed bullets. But such a denial would not have exonerated the 
Dublin Brigade itself from blame. This situation should have served as a propaganda gift 
to London and Dublin Castle in countering Sinn Fein’s promotion of Kevin Barry as a 
victim of British injustice. Once again, however, the British side remained silent, even 
though Macready begged the Irish Situation Committee to have ‘some person in authority 
in England’ respond by linking Barry publicly to the use of flat-nosed ammunition.42 
 
At least General Macready seemed to recognize both the difficulty of initiating a counter-
propaganda campaign and the consequence of not doing so.  As he explained to the CIGS 
in a letter of 1 November: 
...this case of Kevin Barry will be published throughout the country as the murder 
of a patriotic boy by the Government, and nothing will be said or known about 
the fact that he murdered two (sic) young soldiers about the same age as 
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himself.... People may think that this is the fault of our propaganda, but you 
cannot get propaganda in this country, for one reason because Irish newspapers 
are afraid, even if they wish to put our side of the case, and if they did their 
editions would be burnt in the same way as all English newspapers… are now 
destroyed.43 
Of course, Macready’s assertion about the press in Ireland being either too biased or 
intimidated to carry reports of the British side of the case was only part of the story. It did 
not explain why the British authorities themselves failed to utilize the press in England to 
exert an influence on public opinion there, as well as overseas, favourable to the official 
position on the Barry case. Nor did it indicate why virtually nothing seems to have been 
done by Basil Clarke and the PIB to counter the sympathetic view developing in the 
public mind in respect of Barry’s fate, as a consequence of Sinn Fein’s short-term, but 
patently effective anti-British propaganda campaign. This inactivity on the part of the 
British is quite puzzling, particularly in circumstances where the balance of factors 
relating to Kevin Barry and the Monk’s Bakery incident appeared to offer them a clear 
advantage over Sinn Fein in the propaganda stakes. 
 
Perhaps Basil Clarke and company were preoccupied with what they considered to be 
other, more pressing priorities. For instance, according to Clarke’s Sinn Fein counterpart, 
Desmond Fitzgerald, foreign press interest in Ireland over this period focused mainly on 
the fate of Terence MacSwiney and the wave of reprisals by Crown forces against the 
civilian population. ‘The endurance and death of Alderman MacSwiney received extra-
ordinary publicity,’ Fitzgerald told the Dail, ‘and impressed the world with the heroic 
nature of Ireland’s struggle against England’, while the adverse publicity concerning 
reprisals by Crown forces in Ireland was said to ‘have been most damaging to England’s 
prestige.’44 Clearly, these were matters which those charged with the responsibility of 
defending British interests in the public arena could only ignore at their peril. But the 
same could also be said about the Barry case, especially early in November 1920 follow-
ing his execution and publication of the affidavit alleging that he had been tortured at the 
North Dublin Union by his British military captors. The British authorities, for the most 
part, seem not to have made any distinction initially between the movement for a reprieve 
for Barry and the Sinn Fein propaganda campaign. Consequently, they regarded Sinn 
Fein’s input simply as an attempt to influence the outcome in respect of a reprieve for 
Barry.45 So once his execution took place on 1 November, they expected that would be 
the end of the matter. This was an unrealistic expectation, of course, even though the 
execution did proceed without incident or reprisals by the IRA, public outrage in Ireland 
was confined largely to church services – perhaps an accidental benefit of scheduling it 
on a holy day of obligation in the Catholic Church calendar – and police intelligence 
reports from some areas even suggested a noticeable decline thereafter in community 
support for militant nationalism.46  
 
Sinn Fein, along with other critics of the government’s supposedly merciless attitude in 
proceeding with the execution, immediately demonstrated the unrealistic nature of 
official expectations in this regard by utilising the press ‘extensively…for propaganda 
purposes’ and having Barry’s affidavit read in the House of Commons.47 These were 
initiatives demanding a prompt and deliberate response from the British side that simply 
did not come. British spokesmen seemed content to confine themselves to responding to 
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questions in the House of Commons and correspondence from Members of Parliament 
pertaining to Barry and the Monk’s Bakery incident. The only other public reference to 
Barry was in Lloyd George’s speech at the Guildhall in London on 9 November, during 
which the Prime Minister defended the actions of Crown forces in Ireland in resorting to 
reprisals and, in an oblique reference to Barry’s execution, prematurely credited the 
British Government with having ‘murder by the throat….’48 He did not attempt to address 
any of the issues pertaining to the Barry case in this speech, which was an exercise in 
boastful political posturing on the part of Lloyd George, rather than an effective response 
to the many critics of his government’s role in Irish affairs. The Prime Minister would 
soon regret his bold assertion about having ‘murder by the throat’ in Ireland, given what 
was to come later in November and December, with surprise attacks by the IRA taking a 
heavy toll on Crown forces – especially in Dublin (21 November), near Kilmichael (28 
November) and at Dillon’s Cross in Cork (11 December) – and bringing reprisals by the 
Auxiliaries, which culminated in the burning of a large part of the city of Cork by the 
latter on the night of 11 December 1920. These events demonstrated publicly that Lloyd 
George’s government was presiding over a situation in Ireland where the violence and 
loss of life on both sides seemed beyond its power to control. But the government had 
exercised control over the death of Kevin Barry, through the ROIA under which he was 
convicted and condemned, and then by firmly rejecting all appeals for clemency in his 
case. And for this it was being publicly condemned, without offering a defence of its 
position. Irrespective of the reasons for this failure by the British to take the initiative and 
respond effectively in respect of Kevin Barry’s situation, ultimately the way was left 
clear for Sinn Fein to promote its version of events without any serious opposition from 
the other side and, thus, without any negative factors to tarnish the image of Barry as a 
young republican martyr. 
 
In death, Barry became a positive and enduring symbol of Irish republicanism while other 
aspects of the story pertaining to the Monk’s Bakery incident, and of those who suffered 
and died as a consequence, have largely faded into oblivion, with time and events passing 
them by. 
 
Another martyr for old Ireland, another murder for the Crown, 
Whose brutal laws to crush the Irish could not keep their spirit down. 
Lads like Barry are no cowards, from the foe they will not fly. 
Lads like Barry will free Ireland, for her sake they’ll live and die. 
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